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Religion and Religious Law in the Quest
for Marital Harmony: Developments in
the Jurisprudence of Contemporary
Canon Law
By WILLIAM W. BASSETT
MA., 1958, S. TL, 1959, St. Mary of the Lake; J. CD., 1965, Ponql/ical Gre-
gorian University;.J.D., 1972, Catholic University; Professor of La; Univer-
sity of San Francisco
In major American universities today the study of medieval canon
law is an important part of programs relating to the history of Western
legal traditions, the history of ideas and political theory. The medieval
canon law, as Walter Ullmann observed, has emerged from the ghetto
of sectarian apologetics into the mainstream of historical studies.'
The role of the medieval jurists of the canon law tradition was
vital in shaping the principles of methodology of the science of law in
the West. Legal historians realize this. They reap today the fruits of a
renaissance of scholarly studies that began with critical editions of me-
dieval canonical texts in the last century by J.F. von Schulte, Emil
Friedberg, Paul Hinschius, Rudolf Singer, Augustin Theiner, and
others. Walter Holtzmann is of venerable memory, while the genius of
the greatest of his students, Stephan Kuttner, continues to give light to
those who search our legal past for understanding.2 Harold Berman, in
each of his last four articles, reminds American legal audiences that an
understanding of the medieval canon law is pivotal to an enlightened
theory of the development of modem law and governmental institu-
tions.3
1. W. ULLMAN, MEDIEVAL PAPALISM: THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MEDIEVAL
CANONIST vii (1949).
2. See generaly K. PENNINGTON & R. SOMMERVILLE, INTRODUCTION TO LAW,
CHURCH AND Soc=TY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF STEPHAN KuTTNER XI (1977). Professor
Stephan Kuttner, in addition to his prolific scholarly publications, has edited THE BULLETIN
OF MEDIEVAL CANON LAW since 1956. (The Institute of Medieval Canon Law, The Univer-
sity of California, The School of Law, Berkeley, California).
3. See Berman, The Religious Foundations of WVestern Law, 24 CATm. U.L REv. 490
(1975); The Crisis of Western Legal Tradition, 9 CREIGHETON L. REy. 252 (1975); rhe Origins
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Not all students of canon law, however, are medievalists. The ca-
non law in the major Christian churches is alive and well today. It
regulates the ministries of the churches, provides stability and order to
their institutions, and deeply influences the lives and beliefs of the
faithful. The churches, we must not forget, are not only major reposi-
tories of the traditions of our culture and civilization; they are also the
most significant organs of national and international social and charita-
ble cooperation. Understandably, there are hundreds of scholars here
and abroad for whom the contemporary canon law of the church and
its internal institutional regulations and processes are the objects of in-
tense and continuous study.
The canon law in the church today is a ferment of creative change
and vitality in a paradoxically antinomian ecclesiastical milieu. In
American law schools, however, knowledge of contemporary canon
law is extremely limited and those interested in it are so few as to ap-
pear to be devotees of some arcane and unrelated cultic ritual. Yet, this
author believes that there are among modern canon lawyers here and
in Europe some of the finest jurists in the world today.
This article relates the insights of some of these contemporary ju-
rists as they affect the canon law of marriage. The forum of their advo-
cacy and debate is the oldest continually working court in the Western
world, the Holy Roman Rota.
Canon Law in Process of Reform
In the 20th century the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church
has undergone two profound transformations. Each has elicited waves
of criticism and provoked fundamental legal repercussions within the
church. The first major change occurred during the period of codifica-
tion of the canon law. The task of codification, the chief author of
which was Cardinal Pietro Gasparri, was begun before the first World
War. It reached its apex in what was hailed as the perfect legal code-
the Benedictine Code of 1917-and continued through various subse-
quent compilations until the late 1950's. The code achieved an unprec-
edented systematic organization and classification of the canons.4
Despite the internal consistency of this codification, it was soon to
become outdated due to major reform movements within the church.
of Western Legal Science, 90 HARV. L. REV. 894 (1977); The Background of the Western
Legal Tradition in the Folklore of the Peoples of Europe, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 553 (1978).
4. See Kuttner, The Code of Canon Law in Historical Perspective, 28 TnE JURIST 129
(1968).
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Only fifty years after its promulgation the code had degenerated into a
pastoral straight-jacket that was stifling Christian life through its exces-
sive formalism.
The second transformation began during the Second Vatican
Council which Pope John XXIII called into session on January 5,
1959.5 Pope John linked the renewal of the Vatican Council to a gen-
eral reform of canon law. He spoke of a need to reform the canon law
according to the needs of the times by intergrating it with the best of
contemporary theology, liturgical studies, and the human sciences.
This reformation would prepare the church for a reunion of the
churches, a new oikumene. This second transformation, now directed
by an international commission of scholars, is still in progress. 6 It has
precipitated broad and bitter controversies and caused a reassessment
of the role of law within the church and in Catholic life.7
One of the areas most affected by these two transformations has
been the canon law of marriage. Modern Catholic canon law on the
regulation of marriage is the subject of intense and continuous study
and debate. The forum for this debate is the Holy Roman Rota.8 The
transformation of the canon law on marriage has assumed a special
urgency in recent years due to the alarming increase in the divorce rate.
THE PASTORAL PROBLEM
Family breakdown and the complex social, moral, legal, and emo-
tional problems occasioned by it are an increasing problem of our cul-
ture. The divorce rate in the United States during the last ten years has
doubled.' The number of children displaced and disturbed as a result
has reached epidemic proportions. Because of this widespread break-
down in marriage, uprooted, disillusioned, and, in many cases, perma-
nently embittered men and women leave or severely reduce their
formal and sacramental relationship with the church in numbers that
are almost impossible to calculate, but which are known now to repre-
sent millions of Catholics in parishes throughout Europe and
5. 51 ACrA APOSTOLICAE SEDs 65 (1959).
6. See Green, The Revision ofthe Cod" The First Decade, 36 THE JuRIs 353 (1976).
7. Green, Theological Implications of the Revision of Canon Lag, 40 THEOLOGICAL
STUDIES 593 (1979). I detailed some fundamental points of disagreement several years ago
in The Code of/Canon Law anda Crisis fReorm, 9 J. OF ECUMENICAL STUD. 5 (1973).
8. The Holy Roman Rota is located in Rome. The judges of this court are appointed
by the Roman Pontiff for life.
9. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 51
(1975).
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America.'0 The result of the increase in the incidence of divorce has
been a complete rejection of the church's traditional teachings on mar-
riage by a growing number of young people and an inevitable aliena-
tion of their children from the church. This destructive trend has
placed an even greater responisibility on the church to encourage, pre-
pare, and assist the faithful who are still attempting to lead responsible
and committed married lives. The great challenge faced by canon law-
yers is to maintain the tradition of a belief in the sacredness and fidelity
of married love and attempt to help those who fail to realize this goal.
The change in canon law has been organic and gradual. The law
still remains faithful to tradition and sacramental theology, liturgical
studies and ecumenical studies continue to provide the theoretical basis
for the law of marriage in the church." However, the recent pastoral
urgency to incorporate the insights of modem psychology and behav-
ioral studies into the canons is necessarily shaping the practical appli-
cation of the law. By synthesizing these forces the canonists have taken
two giant steps. First, they have generally agreed that the sacramental-
ity, permanency, and exclusivity of marriage need not be based on the
paradigm of the law of contract. Second, in reaching for this modem
synthesis of psychology and theology, they have provided an entirely
new system to assist devout couples in their attempts to achieve peace
and harmony in marriage.'"
Divorce
Divorce has never been flatly prohibited by the canon law.13 Tra-
dition allows a marriage that is defective to be set aside, and there, were
10. See generally Glendon, The American Famol in the 200th Year of the Republic, 10
FAM. L.Q. 335, 340 (1976).
11. The bibliography on this subject is already too vast to detail here. One may note
references in Mackin, Conjugal Love and the Magisterium, 36 THE JURIST 263 (1976); two
volumes of CONCILIUM (1970-Moral Theology; 1973-Canon Law); and several complete
issues of STUDIA CANONICA (Ottawa), particularly Volumes IX (1975) and X (1976),
12. For example, if a first marriage has broken down irremediably and a second mar-
riage exists in fact, these two giant canonical changes translate into a usual attitude on the
part of canon lawyers to make every effort to assist the couple in the second marriage, The
goals are sacramental reintegration of the couple into the life of the church and a healing of
conscience in order to start a new life. These are the twin themes in the new canon law
which seeks:also to preserve the tradition of sacramental fidelity as enunciated in Ephesians
5:32-33: "This is a great mystery, and I mean in reference to Christ and the church; how-
ever, let each one of you love his wife as himself, and let the wife see that she respects her
husband."
13. For a splendid history of the complex development of the modem canon law of
marriage, see J.T. NOONAN, THE POWER TO DISSOLVE: LAWYERS AND MARRIAGES IN TilE
COURTS OF THE ROMAN CURIA (1972).
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always provisions for release from destructive and tortuous unions.
Remarriage was allowed on proof that the first union was a sham or
that it lacked an element essential to the Catholic concept of marriage.
The goal of modem canon lawyers is to search for and redefine the
vital elements of marriage so that a marriage can be dissolved without
driving the faithful from the church. This redefinition allows change
within an unbroken tradition.
The theoretical and substantive changes in the canon law defini-
tion of marriage have been aided by recent procedural developments.
First, there has been a great increase in the number of diocesan tribu-
nals staffed with canon lawyers able to assist divorced persons.' 4 Previ-
ously divorce was unassisted and prohibited. Before the opening of the
Vatican Council in 1962, fewer than one third of the dioceses in the
United States had tribunals or, indeed, any formal way to provide a
canonical solution to marital problems.1 5 Divorce was uniformly con-
demned, and divorced and remarried persons were ostracized.
By 1977 every diocese in the United States, except two newly-
formed ones, had a working tribunal. Whereas ten years ago probably
not more than 75 to 100 formal decisions were made in the entire
United States, last year saw 23,524 decisions and 35,969 formal cases
accepted. Routine administrative cases, Ze., defect of form, the privi-
lege cases, and dissolutions of non-consummated marriages, would
more than double that number. This means that the canon law of mar-
riage was applied in cases last year that touched upon the marriages of
100,000 to 150,000 persons in the United States.
Second, the amount of reported marriage case law of diocesan
tribunals increased due to the appearance of The Tribunal Reporter in
1970 and the annual edition of Matrimonial Jurisprudence which con-
tained English translations of leading Rotal decisions published in con-
junction with the annual conventions of the Canon Law Society of
America. Before these publications, the paucity of reported informa-
tion led to great caution and little mutual encouragement of new ideas
14. Canon 1572, The Code of Canon Law (1917) [hereinafter cited as C.I.C.).
15. The diocesan tribunals were arranged as courts of first instance, subject to metropol-
itan tribunals in each ecclesiastical province. Appeal to the Holy Roman Rota was either
direct or indirect, discretionary or mandatory on concurring decisions. Appeal to a concur-
ring decision in second instance was the rule until 1969 in all decisions affirming the nullity
of marriage. Decisions in all instances were rererred only to the parties involved, though a
reasoned decision had to be rendered by law in each formal case. The jurisprudencevf the
Rota was authoritative, but Rotal opinions and decisions were not published at length until
ten years had passed after the finalizing of the appeal process. It is evident how this proce-
dure, which kept opinions secret for an entire decade, inhibited timely change in canon law.
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among the tribunals. In 1970 only eighteen dioceses cooperated in the
original publication of The Tribunal Reporter. In 1977, 146 out of 157
tribunals reported their work. These two procedural advancements
created the equivalent of a communications explosion within the
church. Meaningful change, which had previously been inhibited by
the lack of tribunals and barriers to the exchange of information, was
now possible, and the canon lawyers have responded accordingly.
Aided by the increasing availability of cases and decisions, canon
lawyers have initiated profound changes in the canon law. Of these
changes, the most significant is the new Catholic understanding of mar-
riage. As a result of the Second Vatican Council the notion of contract
as the paradigm for marriage has been discarded in discussions of the
theology of marriage. The contractual notion of consent has been a
major point of change. Consent is still necessary for marriage, but this
consent now must be "mature" consent, a concept which embodies a
person's action throughout the marriage as vitiating or supporting the
initial consent. "Marital capacity" is now the capacity of a person for a
complex, rich relationship, not for objective procreational acts con-
tracted for by an eternal bilateral agreement executed at the moment of
consent. This change in the definition of marriage has transformed ca-
non law attitudes toward marriage from that of almost inflexible prohi-
bition of dissolution to a tentative, probing, and sensitive
instrumentality of compassion. 6 To understand this change we must,
however, examine the pre-Vatican II idea of marriage.
MARRIAGE AS A COMMUNION OF LIFE
The concept of marriage which prevailed when the 1917 Code of
Canon Law was promulgated (reaffirmed by Pope Pius XI in 1930, in
his encyclical On Christian Marriage) was that Catholic marriage was a
sacrament and became an unrescindable contract once baptized per-
sons properly exchanged conjugal consent. The underlying notion was
that marriage existed in a contract.' 7
This juridical notion envisioned the contract as consisting of a
consent to exchange rightsfor acts which of themselves were solely for
the purpose of generating children. This concept had arisen in the
course of the Middle Ages during the rediscovery of Roman Law and
16. See Green, Marriage Nulliy Processes in the Schema De Processibus, 38 THE JURIST
311 (1978).
17. Canon 1012, C.I.C. The encyclical letter On Christian Marriage of Pope Pius XI
(Casti Connubii, Dec. 31, 1930), 22 AcTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 539 (1930). In English, see A.
VERMEERSC=I & T.L. BOUSCAREN, WHAT IS MARRIAGE? (1932).
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had been solidified in the classic canonical treatises of the Reformation
era and in the jurisprudence of the Rota. The contract notion was reaf-
firmed at the Council of Trent.' 8
This concept of marriage as a stable and enduring contract begin-
ning at a definite moment and valid thereafter, allowed only certain
exceptions. The most traditional exception was the dispensation of a
marriage which had been contracted validly, but which had not yet
been physicially consummated. For various reasons, such a juridically
valid bond could be annulled.
Another exception which developed after the promulgation of the
Code of Canon Law concerns the dissolution of marriages contracted
by a Catholic and non-Catholic. Roman practice also held that the
Privilege of the Faith permitted dissolution and remarriage if one's for-
mer partner was non-Catholic.
Aside from these two exceptions, the only way to obtain release
from a former broken marriage was to successfully attack the validity
of the contract. The success of such efforts was extremely rare, how-
ever. The contract of marriage enjoyed the presumption of validity by
law, placing upon the plaintiff a heavy burden of proof.19 The Second
Vatican Council formally articulated a development in the understand-
ing of marriage which had been germinating for years. The Council
termed marriage "a community of life" (consortium vitae confltgalis)
which is initiated in a formal sense at the moment of consent but which
embodies later developments which can support or obviate that con-
sent.
This "mature" consent is dynamic. It rests on important prior acts
and envisions development throughout life. Marriage, the Council
held, does not consist merely in saying "I do," but also in effectively
performing the full implications of that utterance.
The Second Vatican Council expressed this new doctrinal belief in
the Constitution on the Church and the Modern World, Gaudium el
Spes-z0 It was reiterated with considerable elaboration by Pope Paul
VI in the encyclical letter Humanae Vitae in 1968.21
The Council did not deny that matrimony involves an initial
agreement and begins at a clear juridical moment. However, they
18. The Council of Trent, Sess. VII, De Sacrantentis in Genere, com. 1 [March 3, 1547]
H. DENZINGER, ENCHIRIDION, SYMBOLORIUM, n. 1601 (1963).
19. Canon 1014, C.I.C.
20. THE PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH AND THE MODERN WORLD, Sec.
48, at 250-52 (1963). Encyclical letter Humanae Vitae of Pope Paul VI (Sept. 30, 1968).
21. 60 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 481 (1968).
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shifted the juridical and practical emphasis to the community of life-
the relationship-which is lived thereafter. The consequences of this
clear and definite change have been widespread both in the juridical
practice of ecclesiastical tribunals and the pastoral practice of the
church.
NULLIFYING MARRIAGES
An annulment, or a declaration that an attempt at marriage was
not a true marriage at all, was formerly based upon certain very clear
and objective scholastic criteria. These developed from an understand-
ing of what constitutes a contract, ie., in order to enter a contract, a
person has to know what he or she is attempting to do. People who
were shown to be ignorant of what constituted the basic project of mar-
riage-procreation of children-or how it came about, were judged in-
capable of marriage. People who were insane were also incapable of
giving the actual consent, so long as they could prove that they were
insane at the moment they attempted to give the consent.
The church also stated that people can simulate their consent to a
contract, or commit fraud. Fraud, however, was strictly construed by
the church courts to mean either an attempt to deceive by saying "yes"
and meaning "no" to the contract itself, or an attempt to exclude from
the marriage one of the basic properties of the contractual relationship.
Thus, a person who intended to divorce, exclude fidelity, or refuse the
possibility of marriage with children-at least to the extent of exclud-
ing the right to conjugal relations open to generation-was considered
to have attempted marriage in an invalid manner.
As indicated, the pronouncements of Vatican II shifted the focus
away from viewing marriage as a contract which must be verified pre-
cisely at the point of time at which consent is exchanged. Rather, it
considered marriage as a state of life-a way of living together. Two
individuals might be quite capable of establishing a knowing and vol-
untary consent and might truly intend to accomplish what the church
intends by the sacrament of matrimony. Nevertheless, these same two
people actually may be incapable of sustaining the relationship in a
meaningful way. The object of consent and not the moment of agree-
ment thus became the new focal point of canonical juridical inquiry
into the relationship.
Because of this broadened notion of marriage, church tribunals
now grant more annulments than was previously considered possible.
For example, in the Diocese of Brooklyn, in 1978, decisions of nullity
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were granted in 695 out of 700 cases. The annulments allow remar-
riage without excommunication or exclusion from the sacrament.'
Tribunals now declare null and void marriages contracted by people
who are incapable of establishing a community of life and love to-
gether, not only because of insanity or fraud, but because of psycholog-
ical or behavioral differences.2
An example of this is the case of a properly formalized marriage, a
slow discovery of incompatability, and an increasingly intolerable liv-
ing situation with divorce becoming inevitable. If one of the divorced
parties approaches an ecclesiastical tribunal today with the hope of re-
marrying, an annulment probably would be granted on the grounds
that he or she was incapable of assuming or fulfilling the permanent
responsibilities of a lasting marriage or establishing a "community of
life" and love.24 The church now holds that if one is psychologically
incapable of fulfilling the agreement as the marriage progresses the
marriage contract is invalid since one cannot be held to what one is
incapable of doing.' A decade ago these same persons would have
been denied an annulment because at the time the marriage was cele-
brated they knowingly and willingly consented to the marriage.
The Elements of Marriage
These jurisprudential developments necessarily require a re-exam-
ination of the elements of a Catholic marriage and the sacramental sta-
tus of the marriage. Canon lawyers have been forced to consider
whether the decree of the Council of Trent which defined marriage as
an act of consent between two baptized persons and declared that mar-
22. Reinhart, The Emphasis ir American Tribunals, 34 EPFHEMERIDES JURIS CANONICI
64 (1978). The penalty of excommunication for remarriage after divorce without a declara-
tion of nullity was not a part of the common canon law of the universal church. It was a
penalty adopted by American bishops at the II Plenary Council of Baltimore in 1854. The
penalty was revoked by the American Bishops in 1977.
23. The most common formal grounds of a declaration of nullity are: contractual inca-
pacity due to mental illness or physical incapacity, conditioned consent, force and fear, sim-
ulation and error.
24. The leading decisions of the Sacred Roman Rota to develop this line of thinking are
those of Arthur Sabattani, Pericles Felici, Louis Ann6, Vincent Fagiolo, Charles Lefebvre
and John Serrano-Ruiz.
25. An interesting element in this developing tribunal practice is the involvement of
"post-factum" argumentation and the heavy reliance upon psychiatric evidence and advice.
In this regard, the psychological "findings" of the Rota, derived largely from phenomeno-
logical psychology and extensive analysis of contemporary psychiatric studies, lead the
lower courts into extensive evaluations of the life of the married couple that can prove not
only to be juridically enlightening, but more importantly, instructive and helpful to the par-
ties in contracting a second marriage.
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riage was a contract and a sacrament, were based upon rebuttablepre-
sumptions. If this tridentine decision was based only on the Catholic
perception of married persons in the sixteenth century, then present
Catholic perceptions may permit revision.
Traditionally, the sacrament of marriage symbolized the love of
Christfor the Church as expressed by Paul in Ephesians 5:32. Modem
sacramental theology teaches that marriage is a sacrament of the
church and that all sacraments are relative to the life of the church,
which is itself the fundamental sacrament. Modem matrimonial tribu-
nals are, however, becoming concerned with totally redefining mar-
riage as a religious act which is important for the life and satisfaction of
the couple. The sacrament of marriage is fundamental to the life of the
church since marriage is where the love of Christ for his people actually
"occurs," embodied in the mutual love of man and wife. Thus, the new
emphasis requires that the couple be capable of supporting that impor-
tant sacramental reality both at the juridically verifiable moment of
contractual consent and during their regular lives.
Invalidiy Arisingfrom Personal Incapacity to Fuftil Obligations of
Marriage
Because of this concentration on the daily lives of the faithful, the
Roman Rota and the lower ecclesiastical tribunals have been forced to
develop an extensive jurisprudence on mental and emotional condi-
tions affecting the validity of marriage. Previously, these courts had
approached marriages which involved a question of psychological ca-
pacity to consent by focusing on the level of discretion enjoyed by the
parties at the very moment of the exchange of the nuptial vows. The
crucial issue for earlier matrimonial courts was whether an incapacitat-
ing illness or fraud was manifest at the time of the wedding, since only
this would have rendered the party incapable of eliciting true consent. 6
Particularly since the reconstitution of the Rota by Pius X in 1909,
there has been a considerable evolution in Catholic understanding of
the mental and psychic capacity necessary for entering a valid mar-
27riage.
Since the time of the 13th century Glossa Ordinaria on the Decree
26. As John Keating remarks: "The traditional jurisprudence of the Sacred Roman
Rota has always, until very recently, sought the source of nullity in the contractant's mental
ability to elicit during the wedding naturally sufficient consent." J. KEATING, THE- BEARING
OF MENTAL IMPAIRMENT ON THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE 38 (1964).
27. Id. at 109-23; see also Keating, The Legal Test of Marital Insanity, I STUDIA CA-
NONICA 21 (1967).
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of Gratian,28 the degree of consent required to contract a true marriage
was the same as that considered adequate knowingly to commit a
crime. This was called the use of reason rule. The use of reason rule
gave way to a new norm which grew out of Canon 1082 of the 1917
Code, which stated: "1. In order that matrimonial consent may be pos-
sible it is necessary that the contracting parties be at least not ignorant
that marriage is a permanent society between a man and a woman for
the procreation of children. 2. This ignorance is not presumed after
puberty." This second test focused on the actual age of the parties, and
presumed an ability to give valid consent after one reached the age of
puberty.
Thus, the Rota judges began to declare marriages invalid when a
party to the marriage was shown to have been deprived of that level of
discretion which is proper to an adolescent at the age of puberty 9
However, the church held that even in the case of an individual who
had a serious mental illness prior to marriage and who reached the
terminal stage of that illness shortly after marriage, there was still the
possibility of his having a lucid interval at the time of the wedding
which permitted true consent. As long as the church emphasized the
actual age of the parties, and all attention was focused on the moment
of contracting, the jurisprudence regarding lucid intervals remained
central to the processing of insanity cases.
In the mid-1950s, another test was formulated, principally by Per-
icle Felici, which is employed today as the criterion of due discretion
necessaryfor a valid marriage. Rather than focusing on the numerical
age of the parties, the court looked to the mental capability of each
person.
In two separate decisions removing the puberty age requirements
the Rota reasoned that the restrictions regarding minimal age for val-
idly contracting marriage were placed in Code Canon 1067 primarily to
assure adequate mental maturity of those contemplating marriage.
Hence, the minimal legal test for due discretion could not simply be the
age or mental maturity which is characteristic of those who are on the
threshold of puberty. It is not enough to presume capacity to marry.
The code required more for the expression of valid consent. In the first
decision, eminent Rotal Judge Peter Mattioli offered the court's ration-
28. See generally J.T. NoONAN, supra note 13, at 148-53.
29. See, eg., the decision in coram Prior, Nov. 14, 1919. 11 Sententiae et Decrlone.r
Sacrae.RomanelRotae (hereinafter cited Dec. S.R.RI) 170 (1919). The decisions are cited by
the name of the Judge writing the opinion, with the date of the decision as well, eg., coram
de Iorio, Dec. 1, 1969.
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ale for this new standard. As long as an adult, either because of an
illness or because of some congenital mental deficiency (imbecility, fee-
ble-mindedness, etc.) is considered by medical experts to be at the dis-
cretionary level of a seven-year-old or of an adolescent who has
scarcely reached puberty, such a person can be regularly presumed, in-
deed ought to be presumed, incapable of eliciting valid consent, unless
the contrary is demonstrated by cogent arguments.-
In this case, the Rota decided that the plaintiff could remarry be-
cause the deteriorating effects of her husband's hereditary syphilitic
condition on his mental capacity rendered him incapable of valid con-
sent. He was considered by medical experts to have the mental charac-
teristics of an adolescent who had barely reached puberty.
3 1
The second decision, by Felici, expanded the reasoning by Matti-
oli, declaring that human intelligence evolves very dramatically at the
time of adolescence. At this age, a person becomes more aware of his
own individuality, begins to perceive himself in relation to others more
reflexively, begins to abstract universal concepts from particulars, and
begins to form judgments about particulars. Felici maintained that the
critical faculty-to make judgments about particulars-which develops
later cannot be assumed to be sufficiently operative at the onset of pu-
berty. Thus, if an individual lacks the mental age of at least a fourteen-
year-old, he or she is not able to effect valid matrimonial consent.32
Admittedly in this landmark case, the degree of discretion was evalu-
ated according to a rather static norm; that is, the medical experts' ap-
praisal of the husband's mental age at the time of the marriage.
In the more important and innovative cases of the last decade, the
Rota has engaged in more dynamic appraisals to determine adequate
psychic capacity to marry according to the Felici norm.33 In these cases
the presence or absence of due discretion is assessed in terms of the
normal or abnormal functioning and the vitality and the vigor of the
discursive process itself.
34
30. Coram Mattioli, 48 Dec. S.R.R. 871 (1956); coram Felici, 49 Dec. S.R.R. 787 (1957).
31. Coram Mattioli, supra note 30, at 875.
32. Coram Felici, supra note 30 at 789.
33. See Sabattani, L'evolut/on de la Jurisprudence dans les Causes de Nuliht de Marriage
pour Incafacit Psychique, I STUDIA CANONICA 143 (1967).
34. Lucien Ann6, for example, in a decision of 17 January 1967, describes what can
happen to the discursive process in a woman who is suffering from a serious case of nym-
phomania. The hyperactivity of the sense faculties, the appetites, the imagina tion and the
passions can, by bombarding the discursive process while she is formulating the intent to
marry, leave her without adequate freedom of choice. Coram Ann6, 79 IL DiRITro ECCLE-
SIASTICO 3 (1968).
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Invalidity Arising out of Psychological Anomalies
In the last ten to fifteen years, however, another kind of lack of
due discretion has taken shape, specifically in the area of cases involv-
ing sexual anomalies.35 In the latter part of the 1950s and early 1960s
the Rota was presented with several cases in which the capacity of the
parties to elicit true consent was linked to a deeper, more abiding inca-
pacitation which lay at the roots of the psyches involved. Because of
this incapacity the marriages were invalid even though the parties, at
the moment of exchanging vows, apparently exchanged valid consent.
In 1957, it was held by Aurelio Sabbatani, a leading member of
the Rota, that when a psychological anomaly reached a certain stage, it
could render marital consent impossible.36 The court reasoned that
when a psychic illness (nymphomania) becomes serious and intracta-
ble, it invalidates marital consent, since the person afflicted is not capa-
ble of assuming the obligation of conjugal fidelity because of her very
psychic condition (ob &psam suam complexionem), 7
There were two cases heard by the Rota in 1967 which signifi-
cantly refined the nature of this new category of matrimonal nullity.
The first involved another defendant afflicted with nymphomania.3 8
The judges first examined the woman's level of discretion at the time of
the wedding. They then examined her capacity, in the light of her psy-
chological affliction, to assume the obligations of marriage. The find-
ing on this question turned on whether she possessed a sufficient degree
of the libertas executionis (freedom of action) as well as an adequate
level of the libertas electionis (freedom of choice).
Although it was not by any means morally certain that the defend-
ant was deprived of sufficient libertas electionis at the time of the wed-
ding, it was clear that because of her illness she did not possess the
capability of assuming the obligations of matrimony. Hence, the court
judged that because she lacked control of her actions in the area of
marital responsibilities, she was incapable of contracting marriage.
The Rota, under Lefebvre, rejected earlier contractual approaches
which classified homosexuality as psychic impotence, insanity in matri-
monial matters, or an implicit intent not to have children, and held that
in situations where the marriage was never consummated, or consum-
35. P. HuizrtG, SCHEMA DE MATRIMONIO 346 (1963); J. KEATIN O, .upra note 24, at
158-60.
36. Coram Sabattani, 49 Dec. S.R.R. 502 (1957).
37. Id. at 503.
38. Coram Annr, 78 IL Dirrmro ECcLEs csrco 3 (1967).
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mated only a few times with great difficulty and pain, such a martial
bond should be considered null due to the homosexual's incapacity to
assume the obligations of marriage. Thus the lncapacilas assumendi
onera conjugalia (inability to assume the obligations of marriage) was
accepted by the court as a distinct and viable category of defective con-
sent.3
9
In a latter decision the Rota reiterated its position that in cases of
verified homosexuality, where the individual is for all practical pur-
poses incapable of conjugal intercourse, the marriage could be an-
nulled.4' The court reasoned that while due discretion may have been
present at the time of the wedding, this consent is defective because the
essential mental capacity to assume the obligations of the conjugal state
is fatally defective or absent.
A leading commentator has recently noted that as long as the es-
sential object of matrimonial consent includes the/us ad communionem
vitae (right to a community of life) in addition to thejus in corpus (right
to the body), anyone incapable of exchanging thejus ad communionem
vitae is also incapable of eliciting valid matrimonial consent. It matters
little whether this inability springs from a psycho-sexual anomaly or
any sort of psychological disorder, as long as the individual is incapa-
ble of delivering thejus adconsortium totius vitae.4" This has led to the
suggestion that all restrictions be removed from the wording of the ca-
non regarding defective consent so that it would include any inability
to assume the essential obligations of marriage, as long as the incapac-
ity, given the findings of medical science, cannot be categorized as
merely temporary.42
These landmark cases in matrimonial canon law show that the
Rota has accepted incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage as sufficient grounds for nullity when that inability flows from
a psychological anomaly such as nymphomania or homosexuality.
However, in these decisions the Rota called for some limitations,
indicating that there must be practical criteria for judges to apply in
determining the incapacity of the subject or subjects. One leading Rota
judge, Lucien Anne, has recently proposed that any incapacity to as-
sume the essential obligations of conjugal life springing either from a
39. Coram Sabattani 6 IUs CANONICuM 563 (1966). For a more complete exposition of
Rotal jurisprudence on homosexuals, see W. TOBIN, HOMOSEXUALITY AND MARRIAGE
(1965).
40. Coram Ann6, Feb. 25, 1969, 26 EPHEMERIDES JURIS CANONICi 427 (1970).
41. Navarette, De lure ad Vitae Communionem, 66 Periodica 250 (1977).
42. Id. at 432-33.
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serious sexual anomaly or from any acute mental disorder gravely dis-
turbing one's affective life should be considered as potentially invali-
dating matrimonial consent. Any broader scope would not be
practicable for ecclesiastical judges.4 3 Roman professor Urban Nava-
rette would narrow the scope of matrimonial incapacity further, limit-
ing it to those cases stemming from psycho-sexual anomalies.
Invalidi A4risingfrom Refusal to Accept the Obligations of a Catholic
Marriage---the Exclusion of Marital Fideliy
A formal marriage may also be labelled invalid by the courts if
there has been a refusal to accept the obligations of Christian marriage.
One of these obligations is marital fidelity. Recent developments in
this field center around what is labelled the exclusion of maritalfdelity.
According to Rotal jurisprudence there are three basic ways in
which a person can exclude the right and duty of marriage. The first is
simple adultery: giving the right of sexual acts to someone other than
one's spouse implicitly denies a spouse's right to exclusive sexual
fidelity. A second way is "non-acceptance' or "non-assuming" of the
obligation of fidelity. Finally, a person can exclude marital fidelity by
expressly limiting his consent in such a way that it is contrary to the
obligation of fidelity. For example, announcing the explicit intention
to have intimate relations with another person or persons at the time of
such marriage is such a limit upon consent to fidelity.
Prior to Vatican II, fidelity, the "bonurnfidei," was identified with
the unity of marriage. This meant that one had to intend another sex-
ual relationship at the time of contracting the first for the marriage to
be defective on the grounds of exclusion of fidelity. Again, the empha-
sis here was on the contract of marriage, focusing on the moment of
consent, stressing that fidelity and the unity of marriage had to coalesce
precisely at that point.
Recent matrimonial jurisprudence expands this concept to em-
body later events, accepting the refusal of fidelity as a limitation of the
right given to the other spouse during the marriage rather than as the
giving of a sexual right to a third party at the time of contracting.44
43. Coram Annd, Feb. 25, 1969, 26 EPHEMIRIDES JUIuS CANONict 427 (1970).
44. Thus, in coram Canestri, July 15, 1971:
The good of fidelity, about which there are many conceptual errors, is lacking
at least when one of the contracting parties intends, in the very celebration of mar-
riage, over and above the giving and accepting of rights to conjugal acts with the
other party, to retain the right.., of performing conjugal acts with yet a third
party.
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The exclusion of fidelity is now understood as an attempt to free one-
self from matrimonial bonds.45 Thus, an explicit reservation by one of
the marital parties of the right to have intimate relations with someone
other than his or her spouse is, in effect, the reservation of the right to
commit adultery. The Rota has noted, "Such a reservation is a denial
to the other spouse of what is essentially given and received in mar-
riage. 
'46
From opinions such as this it is clear that the identification of mar-
ital unity with fidelity is being deemphasized. This has led to nullifica-
tion of marriages where one party has given the right to sexual acts to
two members of the same sex or where, as is more common, one party
has reserved the right to have intimate relations with someone other
than his or her spouse.4 7 In sum, nonassumption of the obligation of
marital fidelity during the marriage is tantamount to the reservation of
a right to enjoy sexual relations with a non-spouse at the time of
VOWS.
4 8
Thus, nullification of a marriage because of exclusion of marital
fidelity can be established either under the heading of the total rejec-
tion of the obligation to fidelity or because of a limitation of the marital
obligation not to allow intimate relations with another person. In each
case there is a limitation of the rights of the other partner. This situa-
tion is unacceptable according to the traditional received theology of
Catholic marriage.
There are several important consequences of this jurisprudential
development. Marriages may now be declared invalid where one in-
tends to keep a former lover even after marriage to another person.
Marriages can also be declared invalid where one party does not intend
lifelong faithfulness to his spouse.
Before these developments it was considered irrelevant if, before
the marriage, there was a firm intent by one party to continue relations
with another person. Now, such an interest is seen as important evi-
dence that the obligation of fidelity has not been assumed. Judges now
presume that the rights of the spouse have been excluded in such a
situation.
33 Dec. S.R.R. 622. See also, coram Bonet, May 11, 1959. 51 Dec. S.R.R. 252,
45. Coram De Jorio, Oct. 27, 1971. Cf. Arena, The Jurisprudence afthe Sacred Roman
Rota, 32 STUDIA CANONICA 265, 268 (1978).
46. Coram De Jorio, Oct. 27, 1971 citing coram Ewers, April 6, 1977.
47. Id., see also Navarette, De lure ad Vitae Communionem, 66 PE!RIODICA 250 (1977),
Navarette's article remains the outstanding work on this subject.
48. Id. at 269.
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There are, however, no standard jurisprudential formulae for de-
termining with certainty whether a sexual relationship commenced
before marriage and continued afterward signifies the exclusion of the
obligation of fidelity. These questions must be answered on a case-by-
case basis, considering all the circumstances and personalities involved.
When confronted with cases of sexually active persons, modem
Rotal jurisprudence has responded in different ways. If, for example,
the person has a deeply rooted belief in total sexual freedom, such a
belief is not sufficient to establish grounds for nullity. Of course, ex-
pressions of such beliefs are pertinent in proving the intent to exclude
the obligation of fidelity even where there is no confession by the ac-
cused party. It has also been recognized that the specific intent to ex-
clude the full right of a marital partner is evidenced by one spouse's
continuing love for another person at the time of marriage.4 9 The Rota
has maintained, however, that an intent to violate matrimonial fidelity
is not a sufficient ground for annulment. Thus, where one partner had
led a "libidinous life" before marriage but sincerely loved the spouse
after marriage, an annulment was refused.50
It is recognized, however, that a commitment to several persons,
which exists both before and after marriage, can establish exclusion of
fidelity since the behavior exhibits immaturity and emotional instabil-
ity. The connection between multiple sexual experiences and the exclu-
sion of the obligation of marital fidelity because of a psychological
inability to bind oneself to fidelity has been the subject of increasing
jurisprudential scrutiny.51 If there is a virtual intent to engage in non-
marital sexual experiences (even without actual events which exhibit
exclusion) because of a psychological aversion to binding oneself, then
the courts can move easily to finding a psychological incapacity to as-
sume the obligations of marital fidelity.52 The Rota has voided one
marriage for exclusion of fidelity on evidence that the petitioner had
led a promiscuous life coupled with a profound conviction that such
activity was permissible. The court based its decision on testimony by
an expert witness in psychology who interpreted the petitioner's self-
vindication of his actions by reference to a supreme right to freedom as
a sign of psychological incapacity to marry.
The important connection established in the post-Vatican II era
between marital fidelity and community of life rests on sound theologi-
49. Coram Lefebvre, Mar. 6, 1976.
50. Coram Ewers, Sept. 9, 1977.
51. Coram Palazzini, Oct. 8, 1975.
52. Id.
No. 2]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
cal as well as legal grounds. This connection is evident in the conciliar
declaration, "Gaudium et Spes,53 where it was written that when God
instituted Catholic marriage he willed that the spouses be united in a
special kind of love which encompasses the good of the entire person,
both body and soul.54 Rotal jurisprudence, however, has not extended
this principle to assert that a break in communication between marital
partners constitutes a sufficient basis for a finding of nullity because of
exclusion of fidelity. If the Rota were to accord greater value to marital
communication rather than continued cohabitation such ruptures could
result in annulments. This approach could also lead to annulment
based on exclusion of fidelity for desertion or extreme incompatibility.
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: PSYCHOLOGY
IN CANON LAW
The influence of psychological theory on matrimonial jurispru-
dence is reflected in a recent decision in which the court granted an
annulment because of a spouse's inability to sustain the give and take
of the intimate interpersonal relationship. This decision blended the
theology of marriage enunciated by Vatican II and the phenomenologi-
cal psychology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 5 The judge held that mar-
riage is far more than a contractual transaction involving rights and
duties. It is best described as "being for the other," or as intimate shar-
ing of lives.
The problem now facing Rotal jurisprudence is defining a worka-
ble judicial standard for declaring that a marriage in invalid. The Rota
has adopted the position that if one is incapable or unwilling to assume
the essential obligations of marriage, he or she has failed to properly
consent to the marriage, and annulment is therefore proper. But this
position relies on examinations of states of mind and emotional atti-
tudes as seen in hindsight. Such reliance on psychological findings se-
verely limits Rota members who must be morally certain of their
53. PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH AND THE MODERN WORLD, Sec. 55, at
260-61 (1963).
54. "In individua dilectione" which "loliuspersonae bonum complectltur, ideoque corpors
et animae."
55. Major works of Merleau-Ponty include LA STRUCTURE DE COMPORTEMENT (1942)
(THE STRUCTURE OF BEHAVIOR (A. Fisher trans. 1963)); PHLNONANOLOGIE DE LA PERCEP-
TION (1945) (PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION (C. Smith trans. 1962)); Le Prinal de la
Perception et ses Cons,'quences Philosophiques, 4 BULLETIN DE LA SOCIETL FRAN4AISE DE
PHILSOPHIE 119-53 (1974); LE SENS ET NON-SENS (1948) (SENSE AND NON-SENSE (H. Drey-
fus & P. Allen Dreyfus trans. 1964)); LES RELATIONS AVEC AUTRUI CHEz L'ENFANT (1953);
SIGNES (1960) (SIGNS (R. McCleary trans., 1964)).
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decisions. In the numerous situations where moral certainty is impossi-
ble due to the unreliability of psychological data, the church usually
readmits such persons to the sacraments upon a showing of good faith.
Jurisprudential developments have thus led to the partial displacement
of the tribunals as the principle avenue of reconciliation for divorced
persons with the Catholic Church.
This novel psychological approach looks beyond the modem bases
for nullity, such as inability to properly consent, mental and sexual ab-
normality, or exclusion of fidelity. It concentrates on the existence of
an interpersonal conjugal covenant, where there is both a capacity and
a sustained willingness to perpetuate and contribute to this unique rela-
tionship. The difficulty in this approach lies in determining whether
the interpersonal relationship has broken down. Too lax a standard
would equate divorces with nullifications-a result abhorrent to the
church. If a serious defect in an interpersonal relationship really is a
characteristic of a person's incapacity to assume the obligations of mar-
riage, then a nullity could be declared that is consistent with present
legal standards. Whether the incapacity has totally eroded marital con-
sent, or merely deprived it of a desirable degree of perfection, is a ques-
tion of fact to be resolved on a case by case basis.
56
In spite of enunciated misgivings, it is evident from this and other
recent decisions that the church is embracing an enlightened concept of
marriage. It is no longer a contract-it is a flexible interpersonal rela-
tionship, which has sacramental dignity in and of itself.
CONCLUSION
Many of the theological and juridical problems encountered in the
canon law of the past stemmed from the false notion that the contrac-
tual model was the only model of marriage that could have sacramen-
tal validity. Historically, the contractual model may have been the
manner in which most Christians lived out the reality of marriage.
Present canonical jurisprudence, however, looks to the experienced re-
ality of marriage today. Currently, marriage is recognized as a com-
mitment to an interpersonal relationship and the sharing of lives in the
most intimate communion. Applying contemporary philisophical ten-
56. Coram Serrano, April 5, 1973. The primary author used in this section is Maurice
Merleau-Ponty. To buttress his use of Merleau-Ponty, Serrano refcrs to the psychiatrists
who accept his authority and analyses: Semmenari-Castellani, Fenomenologia dellncontro
e Perversione Sessuali" i'Incontro Parafi1ico, 93 RivisA SPERIMENTALE DE FRENIATRIA E
MEDICINA LEGAL DELLE ALiENAZIONI MENTALi 659 (1969); CALUERI, CASTELLANI & DE
VIcENTIs, LINEAMENTI DI UN PSICOPATOLOGIA FENOMENOTOCICA 256-73 (1972).
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ets, present day canon law scholars demonstrate that if this committed
and intimate interpersonal relationship does not exist, then the sacra-
mental marriage, as described by the Second Vatican Council, cannot
be said to have come into being. This focus on the psychology of inter-
personal communication and experience suggests a vastly expanded
scope of inquiry in deciding the nullity of marriage before the Rota.
The canon law on marriage has moved dramatically from a stance
of rigid prohibition of dissolution and ostracization of victims of bad
and broken marriages who wish to marry again to the enlightened and
flexible belief that incapacity to assume and fulfill the obligations of
marriage will allow a marriage to be nullified and leave the parties free
to again pursue Catholic married life. In this endeavor, the church is
attempting to retain the tradition of marital unity and fidelity while
seeking new ways to provide healing and reconciliation. Modern psy-
chological insights into life and love are being integrated into matrimo-
nial jurisprudence and the canonical legal process. The traditional
priorities are being reordered so that the concerns of people take prece-
dence over those of the institution. By redefining the concept of mar-
riage the church is endeavoring to become intimately involved in
promoting and sustaining the harmony of men and women in mar-
riage, thus ensuring that this vital institution can remain a source of
fulfillment, security, and happiness in the future.
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